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R
ick and Kyle are two aspiring thieves with plans to
get rich from reselling antiques on the black
market. For their first heist, they set out to rob an
antique shop in the countryside. They break into the shop’s
back door. When the alarm is triggered, they head to their
getaway car. As they flee, a state trooper pulls the two over
for speeding. Noticing that the car matches the eyewit-
ness description of the one fleeing the scene of the crime,
the trooper searches the car. He finds two unregistered
firearms, and the men are locked up in the county jail. 
Rick and Kyle are placed into separate cells. No commu-
nication is allowed between them. The officer goes to each
cell and gives them the same options: Confess to the rob-
bery or stay silent. If one confesses and the other stays
silent, the confessor will receive no jail
time, but the other must serve five years.
If both stay silent, each gets one year in jail
for the firearms charges. And if both con-
fess, they each receive three years in jail. 
Assuming that Rick and Kyle are self-
interested, each will confess. Rick is
worried that Kyle will not stay silent. So, if
Rick stays silent, he gets five years, but if
he confesses he gets three years. Even if
Kyle decides to remain silent, Rick would
still confess because no jail time is better
than one year in jail. (Similar thoughts are
running through Kyle’s mind.)  
The dilemma is that, for each suspect, confessing is the
better choice no matter what the other person does. But, as
a whole, they are worse off because they end up with a total
of six years in jail when they could have received a total of
two years if they both stayed silent. 
Countless variations of this “prisoner’s dilemma” story
have been pondered ever since mathematician Albert W.
Tucker first coined the term and formalized the game in
1950. Yet the punch line remains the same: Rational individ-
uals acting in their own interest can result in suboptimal
outcomes in the aggregate.  
A common application of the prisoner’s dilemma intu-
ition is in the analysis of the conflict inherent in individual
and group decisions. Members of a group that act in their
own self-interest can end up making the group worse off
than if everyone were to cooperate. 
Examples may be found in the real world. Assume, for
instance, that greenhouse gas emissions are responsible for
global warming and that, all else equal, it would be desirable
to curb climate change. Nations face a choice to either
reduce greenhouse gas emissions or maintain the status quo.
If enough nations cooperate, emissions will fall and the 
temperature stabilize. But since reductions in emissions
require costly actions, any nation could sit on the sidelines
and let other nations bear that cost while they enjoy the 
benefit. With enough selfish nations on the bench, coopera-
tion breaks down and everyone loses relative to what they
could achieve if they worked together. This might also be
recognized as a  “free-rider” problem. Prisoner’s dilemmas
can be seen in this light as an example of such a problem. 
The logic of the prisoner’s dilemma makes a big assump-
tion about individuals: It presumes that they care mainly
about their self-interest. Economic experiments have tested
this assumption. When looking at a variety of prisoner’s
dilemma experiments from 1958 to 1992, Dartmouth
College economist David Sally found that
when participants played the games, on
average, they tended to act selfishly only
about half the time. A plausible explana-
tion for this is that the players are less
prone to selfish behavior than economists
predict. 
Another explanation might be that
cooperation is actually an optimal strategy
in the real world where people interact
with each other repeatedly over time. To
test this, Robert Axelrod, a social scientist
at the University of Michigan, organized a
tournament. Academic colleagues were
invited to submit a computer strategy, which was to be
repeated a number of times.  
As it turns out, the exclusively selfish strategies did very
poorly. The one that fared the best was also the simplest: 
the “tit for tat” strategy developed by a mathematical 
psychologist. It required the player to cooperate on the first
move and then choose the same strategy that the opposing
player picked on the previous turn. While the strategy gives
the benefit of the doubt to the opposing player, it also lets
him know that a lack of cooperation will not go unanswered.
The enforcement of this implied social norm and the nature
of reciprocal behavior over repeated rounds of the game
might explain the rate of cooperation in a variety of experi-
ments.
Or, to put it another way, even inherently selfish individ-
uals may tend to cooperate more often when benefits to
cooperation over the long run outweigh the benefits over
the short run. It is through these experiments that econo-
mists have been able to mine a wealth of economic and
social insight that arises from the hypothetical predicament
of two prisoners.  RF
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